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I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a rule in my Parents’ house. One that I would venture to say is probably
a rule in most homes, albeit it a dwindling one: “No cell phones at the dinner table”. It is
hard to believe that not so long ago, wireless mobile devices were used solely to make
and receive phone calls, perhaps “text message” for the savvy cell phone user. Those
simple devices have turned into something entirely different with the advent of the
modern Smart Phone, dubbed the “third screen” behind the television and the personal
computer. 1 As a society we have come to rely on our Smart Phones for everything, from
finding directions to communicating our whereabouts with friends. These devices have
become an essential body part – impossible and frightening to be without. Yet, as a result
of this modern, wireless world, we are constantly sharing personal information,
particularly that of our geographic location.
During the last decade, the exponential rise of social media and access to the
Internet has caused users to reevaluate the importance of monitoring personal information
disclosure. Particularly, questions of privacy and control over personal information have
gained momentum as data collection through geolocation technologies have become
heightened legal and national importance. However, while geolocation has become a bit
of a buzz word, defining the technology and its potential legal ramifications has proven
difficult. Nearly everyone who uses the Internet is affected by geolocation in some
capacity, whether they know it or not. The technology is constantly working to allow
Internet sites and mobile applications (Apps) to instantaneously identify a user’s
geographic location, and in some instances, use that information to classify an individual

Dana B. Rosenfeld & Matthew P. Sullivan, “Legal Growing Pains in the Mobile App Market”,
Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/September/13.pdf .
1
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and target market accordingly. Specifically for Smart Phone users, if you have not “opted
out” of being tracked by every application that uses the technology, and to a certain
extent even if you have, your device is tracking you.
There is a common question voiced, particularly by younger consumers who
frequently utilize technology in their purchasing behaviors: Why does it matter that
Companies collect geographic data, especially when the tools provide a benefit to the
consumer? After all, most will agree the growth of Smart Phone devices and mobile
Apps have provided interesting, seamless ways to connect social media with purchasing
behaviors and shared activities. The answer: Money, power, and a serious invasion of
personal privacy. As previously stated, Geolocation technologies can aggregate a
comprehensive profile of a person through tracking a user’s travel patterns, work habits,
and precise location at any given moment. With this information, market actors gain an
advantage to use or misuse this data without much concern of breaking any Federal law.
Indisputably, this technology and its potential have begun to revolutionize internet
commerce and communication; however, the law has failed to keep up with the
technology, leaving both Companies and consumers unaware of potential legal
ramifications that may arise.
This article seeks to address recent litigation regarding the use of client-side
geolocation technologies, particularly in conjunction with the surge of Smart Phone
devices available. Furthermore, it aims to provide a recommendation to Companies on
how to best utilize the technology in order to prevent the legal ramifications that may
arise. Part II will give a brief explanation of geolocation technology, address the rising
presence of client-side geolocation tools through the use of Smart Phones, and speak to

4

the effect this has in target marketing campaigns. Part III will examine current case law
to underscore how Courts, who generally side with Defendant Corporations, have begun
to grant Plaintiffs a pass at the pleading stage, particularly on claims asserting violations
of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law, and User Agreements.
Part IV will discuss the Wiretap Act, a significant claim asserted where Plaintiffs have
generally failed. It will also explore the ongoing California case Joffe v. Google and
discuss how this could be a legal game changer for Plaintiffs asserting a Wiretap Act
violation. Finally, Part IV will examine how a lack of action by the Federal Government,
has prompted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and State legislatures to address
privacy concerns and enforce safeguards against Companies utilizing the technology
deceptively. Lastly, the article will provide three significant practices for Companies to
consider before implementing geolocation technologies for target marketing purposes:
Clear and concise User Agreements, opt-in functionality, and secure systems once
personally identifiable information (PII) is collected.

II.

GEOLOCATION TECHNOLOGY – WHAT IS IT?

In order to fully appreciate the impact geolocation has on the law, one must first
understand how the technology, scarce until a mere few years ago, functions.2 Generally
speaking, geolocation is any means for detecting an Internet user’s geographic location.3
While the technology can serve many purposes, its appeal to the advertising industry
began when companies saw its potential for target marketing to users in real-time based

2

Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 Alb. L.J.Sci. & Tech., 61, 63 (2011).
3
Martketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22
Fordham, Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 667, 592 (2012).
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on their geographic location.4 Though the technologies vary, most fall into two
categories: client-side and server-side. Server-side geolocation technologies work
remotely, acquiring information from a user that does not provide specific geographic
location, but rather a user’s Internet Protocol (IP) address.5 The geolocation provider
then evaluates the information against data contained in existing IP addresses and other
geographic identifiers, matching an entry in the server’s database enabler. When the
geolocation provider makes a geographic match, it can often provide a website with a
wealth of information about the user, such as the user’s location within a twenty-five to
fifty mile radius and the device used to access the site.6
Conversely, client-side geolocation tools operate on a user’s personal computer or
wireless device to automatically identify a user’s location through a Global Positioning
System (GPS) or nearby wireless tower. Once the user’s location is tracked, the device
will transmit that location when a website or content provider requests it.7 This usercentric model enables client-side geolocation tools to more readily collect and
disseminate personably identifiable information (PPI). Further, client-side technologies
establish a closer nexus with the user since Smart Phones and other GPS-equipped
devices can be located within a radius of a few dozen feet as opposed to server-side
technologies that collect data regionally.8 While client-side geolocation has been less

4

Id. at 587.
Id.
6
King at 68.
7
Id.
8
Hiawatha Bray, “Software Puts Captions on the Real World”, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/09/24/software_puts_captions_on_the_real_wol
d.
5
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common in the past, the widespread increase of GPS-enabled Smart Phones has made this
technology progressively more popular and controversial.9
The most intuitive, and perhaps the greatest, use of geolocation technology is
content localization through navigation Apps like Waze and mapping platforms such as
Google Maps, Mapquest, and Bing Maps.10 However, in surveying the geolocation
landscape, Companies are progressively using the geographic data for target marketing
purposes, prompting the “World Wide Web” encounter to become less worldwide. 11 As
the technology develops, websites are increasingly blocking certain groups of users –
curbing the Web to target a specific region or user group.12 As an example, Digital
Envoy, a leading geolocation provider, syndicates a user’s location with census data to
target ads based on demographic profiling. Data collection such as this allows companies
to serve different ads to users of the same website. For instance, the site could target
market a high-end “Gold” American Express card to a user connecting from a wealthy
suburb while simultaneously recommending the standard “Green” card to a user from a
less affluent area.13
Smart Phone Apps and other client-side tools are following suit as platforms like
Google Now, Foursquare, and Yelp direct individuals with recommendations, reviews
and deals based on the user’s specific location.14 The new features are designed to

See Ryan Kim, “Apple's Boosts Smart-Phone Market Share”, S.F. Chron., Feb. 24, 2010, at
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Apple-s-boosts-smart-phone-market-share-3198940.php
(recounting the increasing rate of Apple's iPhone sales).
10
JD Lasica, “Beyond Foursquare: Geolocation Services Proliferate, Mature”, Feb. 28, 2013, at
http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2013/02/beyond-foursquare-geolocation-services-proliferate-mature058/.
11
Id.
12
Anick Jesdanun, “Geolocation tech slices, dices World Wide Web”, USA Today, July 7, 2004, at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-10-web-geolocation_x.htm#start
13
Id.
14
Lasica, supra note 10.
9
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automatically present information to a user in real-time – even before you ask for it.15
With an increase of these “targeted” applications, companies like Google and Apple have
discovered more discreet methods of tracking users geographically and marketing
accordingly. The personal nexus of client-side tools coupled with the increase of Smart
Phone applications pose incredible opportunities for future commerce as well as potential
privacy risks. Thus, this article will focus on client-side geolocation technology as
privacy questions and issues appear to be outpacing the legal remedies available.

III.

BRIEF HISTORY OF CASE LAW AND SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS

In lawsuits addressing geolocation issues, the Courts have struggled to uniformly
apply the law16, often attempting to fit old laws into new technologies. As with all novel
claims, Plaintiffs tend to “throw in the kitchen sink” when filing complaints against
Defendant Companies, hopeful their injury will fit into a state or federal statute. Contrary
to popular consumer belief,17 current federal law does not require Corporate giants like
Google, Apple, and other App makers to obtain user consent, or even notify the user
when collecting personal data through geolocation tools.18 However, while Defendant

See Mark Hackman, “Google Knows More About You Than Your Family Does – Are You Okay With
That?” Jun. 29, 2012, at http://readwrite.com/2012/06/29/google-now-knows-more-about-you-than-yourfamily-does-are-you-ok-with-that (recounting how Google Now automatically creates a series of “cards”
that try to assist a user by presenting information Google thinks you’ll need real-time based on the
personal data it’s collected via how you use various Google services).
16
See Somini Sengupta, “No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, New York Times, (October 30,
2013), at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-on-privacylaw.html?_r=0 (with no uniform Federal law in place, over two dozen privacy laws have been passed in
more than 10 states in the year 2013).
17
Joseph Turow et al., “Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and
Three Activities that Enable It”, (2009), at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20090929Tailored_ Advertising.
18
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C §2702 (2006)
15

8

Companies have consistently been able to strike Plaintiff complaints with ease,19 there
are a few areas of the law where Courts are beginning to grant Plaintiffs a pass, at least at
the pleading stage.20 Part III will address the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair
Competition Law, and Privacy Agreements, three areas of law where Courts are
beginning to allow Plaintiffs to prevail. It’s important to note that the 9th Circuit has
taken the lead in addressing internet privacy issues;21 and thus, CA State law and
precedent cases will be the focus of this section. Furthermore, as mentioned previously,
the law in this area is generally unchartered as Courts and State legislatures are beginning
to recognize the impending privacy issues at stake. As a result, Part III will address
recent litigation and analyze cases that are currently ongoing.
A. Consumer Legal Remedies Act
Due to the absence of federal precedent, plaintiffs will often invoke violations of
State statutes or recently passed State privacy laws in lawsuits involving geolocation
technologies.22 With the vast majority of these cases occurring in California,23 Plaintiffs
have claimed a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act under the California Civil
Code.24 The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts

19

See Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-3113-JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 2013) (where Court denied Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, CFFAA, UCL,
CLRA, Breach of Privacy, Breach of Contact, Private Disclosure of Private Facts and Intrusion, Trespass,
and Conversion claims with leave to amend).
20
In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040 (2012); See also In re Google Inc., No.13-MD02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 at *24, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013)(where Court denied Google’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claims because Plaintiffs’ sufficiently alleged Google exceeded scope of its
own Privacy Policy and non-Gmail users did not consent to Google’s interception of emails; however, the
Court held Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that they had an objectively reasonable expectation that their
email communications were ‘confidential’ per Cal. Penal Code§623 nor did they sufficiently allege a
Pennsylvania law claim as it related to those who receieved emails from Gmail users.)
21
See Somini, supra note 16, (recounting that California, the long pioneer on digital privacy laws, has
passed three online privacy bills this year).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1069-71.
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or practices.”25 A claim may be brought under the CLRA pursuant §1780(a) which
provides any “consumer who suffers damage as a result of the use or employment by any
person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by §1770 may bring an action
against such person”.26 The statute bans several types of conduct, such as representing
that goods or services have characteristics or benefits which they do not have.27 Further,
the statute forbids entities from falsely representing that goods or services are of a
particular standard, quality, or that goods are of a particular style or model.28
The CLRA is not a law of general application; rather, it applies to a narrow set of
consumer transactions.29 For example, a CLRA claim may only be alleged by a
consumer, whom the CLRA defines as “an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase
or lease, any goods for personal, family, or household purchases.”30 Consequently, the
CLRA does not apply to government or commercial contracts nor does it apply to
contracts formed by non-profit groups and other non-commercial organizations.31 The
CLRA is also inapplicable to customers entering into rental agreements.32 Finally, while
there is a jurisdictional split as to whether software is a good under the UCC,33 the Ninth
Circuit has previously determined the sale or licensing of software is not covered under
the CLRA because software is neither a “good” nor “service”.34

25

Cal. Civ. Code §1770.
Cal. Civ. Code §1780(a).
27
Cal. Civ. Code, §1770(a)(5).
28
Cal. Civ. Code §1770(a)(7).
29
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).
30
Cal. Civ. Code §1761(d).
31
See Cal. Grocers Assn. Inc. v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217 (1994)(stating trade group,
CGA, is not a consumer of services for family, household, or personal purposes as defined by the CLRA).
32
Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 143 Cal. App. 3d., 133, 143 (1983)(holding that a costumer who rented a car does
not fall within the definition of a “consumer” under the CLRA).
33
Dealer Management Systems Inc. v. Design Automotive Group Inc., 355 App. 3d. 416, 422 (2005)
34
See Ferrington v. McAfee, No. 10-CV-01455, 2010 WL 3910169 at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010).
26
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In the ongoing case iPhone II, Plaintiffs on behalf of both a Geolocation class and
iDevice class allege that Defendant Apple violated the CLRA. Plaintiffs representing the
Geolocation class claim that at a cost to the consumer, Defendant Apple stored geolocation information on user’s iDevices for Apple’s own benefit and Apple continued to
collect geolocation data even when users switched the Location Services to “off”.35 They
contend if Apple had disclosed the true cost of the geolocation technology, the value of
the iPhone would have been materially less than what Plaintiffs paid.36 Similarly,
Plaintiffs representing the iDevice class argue that a significant reason for the purchase of
their iDevice was the appeal of the alleged “free” Apps; therefore, had Apple disclosed
its intentions to track and collect personal information via its applications, the value of
the iDevices would be materially less than what Plaintiffs paid.37 Furthermore, Plaintiffs
hold that despite Apple’s statements regarding privacy protection, Plaintiffs did not
consent to Apple’s tracking of their App use and personal information.38 In both cases,
the Court substantiated the CLRA claim, not because the Apps downloaded were
deficient, but because the iDevices (a “good” under the CLRA) did not perform as
promised by Apple to consumers.39 Thus, Plaintiff’s claim properly arose out of the sale
of a good, not the downloading of software.40

35

iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1070.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1071
39
Id.
40
Id.; See also Yunker, 2013 WL 1282980 at *13 (where Court denied CLRA claim by Plaintiff who
downloaded Pandora App, finding that a number of districts hold downloading a “software” does not fall
within the statutory definition of a good).
36
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B. Unfair Competition Law
Plaintiffs litigating against Companies like Apple who utilize client-side geolocation
tools may also succeed under their State’s Unfair Competition Law.41 The UCL creates a
claim against business practices that are 1) unlawful, 2) unfair, or 3) fraudulent.42 The
law’s coverage is sweeping and its standard for wrongful business is “intentionally
broad” as to permit judicial tribunals to enjoin ongoing wrongful conduct as new business
schemes, practices, and technologies continue to form and develop.43 To assert a UCL
claim, a Plaintiff needs to have “suffered injury in fact and…lost money or property as a
result of unfair competition.”44 In other words, to establish standing under the UCL, a
Plaintiff must show she personally lost money or property because of her reasonable and
actual reliance on the alleged wrongful business practice.45 Once injury is established,
Plaintiff must show a statutory violation under one of the three prongs as each provides a
distinct theory of liability.46 Interestingly, Plaintiffs in iPhone II were able to prevail
under all three prongs of the UCL, begging the question of whether Courts are starting to
take a closer look at business practices exploiting geolocation technologies.47
Under the “unlawful” prong, the UCL prohibits any business practice that is also
forbidden by law. Essentially, the UCL permits injured consumers to “borrow’ violations
of other laws and treat them as a separate, independently actionable claim of unfair
41

iPhone II, 844 Supp. 2d, 1040, 1074.
Cal. Bus. & Profs. Cody §17200.
43
In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 995 (9th Cir. 2006); See also Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v.
L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999)( “The Legislature ... intended by this sweeping language
to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might
occur. Indeed, ... the section was intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language, precisely to enable
judicial tribunals to deal with the innumerable “ ‘new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would
contrive”).
44
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17204.
45
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 330 (2011).
46
Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007).
47
iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1072-74.
42
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competition.48 Thus, in iPhone II, Plaintiffs were permitted to establish an independent
action under the unlawful prong of the UCL through alleging Defendant’s violation of the
CLRA.49
Under the “unfair” prong, the UCL creates a cause of action for a business practice
that is inherently “unfair”, even if it is not be forbidden by law. For consumer cases
specifically, the law under the unfair prong continues to be unsettled.50 Some Appellate
State Courts define “unfair” as prohibiting conduct that is immoral, unethical, or injurious
to consumers and have applied a balancing test, weighing the benefit of Defendant’s
product or service against the gravity of harm to the alleged victims.51 Conversely, other
Courts define “unfair” per the UCL as conduct that violates public policy pursuant a
specific statutory, constitutional, or regulatory provision.52 In iPhone II, the Court did
not apply one test over the other. Rather, the Court conceded that while the societal
benefits of Apple’s geolocation software may ultimately outweigh the harm to users, it
was unwilling to make a factual determination at the pleading stage.53 Other Courts have
found this reasoning persuasive and substantiated a Plaintiffs injury without applying
either balancing test for the “unfairness” of the geolocation service.54
Under the fraudulent prong, a Plaintiff must show that the public is likely to be
deceived and allegations must be specific enough to give Defendants adequate notice of
48

CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. 479 F3d. 1099, 1107 (9 th Cir. 2007).
844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1072
50
Lozano, 504 F.3d at 735-36 (California's unfair competition law, as it applies to consumer suits, is
currently in flux)
51
S. Bay Chevorlet v. General Motors Acceptance, Corp., 136 Cal. App.4th 1255, 1260-61 (concluding the
test of an unfair business practice “involves an examination of that practice's impact on its alleged victim,
balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer…the court must weigh
the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim”; See also People
v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. 159 Cal.App.3d. 509, 530.
52
Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999).
53
iPhone II, 844 Supp. 2d, 1040, 1073
54
In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-md-02264 JSW, 2013 WL 1283236 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2013)
49
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the alleged misconduct.55 Thus, claims of fraud must allege “an account of the time,
place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the
parties to the misrepresentations.”56 Again, despite the specificity requirement of the
statute, the iPhone II Court felt it was justified to allow Plaintiffs’ claim to prevail. The
Court found Plaintiffs on behalf of the geo-location class met the pleading burden
through their allegations that in both Apple’s Terms and Conditions and its letter to
Congress, Apple ensured an opt-out option for the geo-tracking feature.57 Plaintiffs
showed they reasonably relied on Apple’s representations that an opt-out feature was
available when making purchasing decisions.58 Similarly, Plaintiffs from the iDevice
class successfully asserted that Apple’s failure to disclose its collection of personal
information through geo-location technology materially affected the value of the Apple
device purchased.59
C. Violation of User Agreement

When deciding to grant a motion to dismiss, Courts have been allowed to consider
“User Agreements” between business entities and users under the incorporation by
reference doctrine.60 Under California contract law, “if the language of the contract is
clear and explicit, and does not involve any absurdity”, then that language will govern the
interpretation of the contract.61 However, if the contract is capable of two different
interpretations, the contract is ambiguous and the rules require the Court to interpret the
55

Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1985).
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F. 3d. 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007).
57
iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1074.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
In re Gilead Scic. Sec. Litig. 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (where Appellate Court reverses
District Court’s decision holding motion to dismiss was inappropriate when material representations by
Gilead created an unrealistic positive assessment.)
61
Cal. Civ. Code § 1638
56
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ambiguity against the drafter.62 While Plaintiffs have struggled to prove a violation of a
User Agreement, particularly in the context of the internet, Courts are beginning to
consider ambiguity in User and Privacy Agreements of tech giants like Google and
Apple.63 In iPhone II, the Court found Plaintiffs had a colorable argument that Apple’s
Privacy Agreement is ambiguous and found Plainiff’s claims may not necessarily be
foreclosed against Apple. The Court notes:
“It does appear that there is some ambiguity as to whether the information collected by
Apple, including the user's unique device identifier, is personal information under the
terms of the Agreement, and thus whether Apple's collection and use of the information is
consistent with the Agreement's terms”.64

Yet again, the iPhone II Court found that at the motion to dismiss stage, it was unwilling
to rule Apple’s agreement bars the company from liability.65
A California Court conducted a similar analysis of Google’s Terms of Service and
Privacy Agreements in In re Google Inc. Plaintiffs here challenged Google’s operation
of Gmail under the Wiretap Act alleging that Google intercepted, read, and acquired
emails for the purpose of sending target advertisements relevant to the email sender,
recipient, or both.66 Looking closely at Google’s policies, the Court found Google did
not have implied or express consent to intercept emails to create user profiles and target market
accordingly.67 Furthermore, the Court noted that consent within Privacy Agreements may

be express or implied. However, implied consent only applies to a narrow set of cases
and the critical question is whether the parties whose communications were intercepted

62

Cal. Civ. Code § 1654
See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013WL 5423918, at *12-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2013); iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1076
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
In re Google Inc., 2013 WL 5423918 at *12-15.
67
Id.
63
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had adequate notice.68 Thus, the Court found it reasonable that Plaintiffs, upon reading
Google’s Privacy Policies, would not have necessarily understood that their emails would
be intercepted for target advertisement purposes.69

IV.

JOFEE V. GOOGLE – GAME CHANGER FOR THE WIRE TAP
ACT?

The majority of Plaintiffs affected by geolocation technologies will focus their
cause of action around a violation of the Wiretap Act. However, despite the frequency in
which a violation of the Act is brought, Courts have consistently denied relief under the
statute.70 The Wiretap Act generally prohibits the interception of “wire, oral, or
electronic communications”.71 Specifically, the Act provides a private right of action
against a person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”72 While Plaintiffs have failed to substantiate a Wiretap Act claim
against Companies misusing geolocation technologies, a recent CA case may change the
tide.73
In 2007, Google launched its “Street View” initiative, a panoramic viewing
feature on its mapping services. To capture street-level images, Google mounted cameras

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. at 1062 (where the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim partly because geo-location data
collected by Apple was generated automatically rather than through the intent of the user. Thus, the
information did not constitute “content” prone to interception).; See also Google Gmail Privacy litigation,
2013 WL 5423918 NDCA 13-MD-02430-LHK (Sept. 26, 2013).
71
18 U.S.C. § 2520
72
18. U.S.C. §2511(1)(a)
73
Joffee v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d. 1262, 2013 WL 4793247 (9 th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013).
69
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on a fleet of cars.74 From 2007 to 2010 Google also furnished these cars with software
and antennas capable of scanning wireless routers nearby to capture information like a
network’s name and whether that Wi-Fi network was encrypted or not.75 This was done
to enhance the accuracy of its location based services. However, the software also picked
up actual data transmitted through the Wi-Fi networks. This “playload data” included
emails, usernames, passwords, and other personal data.76 In 2010, Google was highly
criticized for the unwarranted data collection, publicly apologized, grounded the cars, and
was ordered in some countries to delete the information entirely.77
Numerous class action lawsuits against Google eventually consolidated into the
ongoing case Joffe v. Google. Plaintiffs ensued their cause of action claiming the
Company’s data collection scheme violated State and Federal wiretap laws.78 In turn,
Google moved to dismiss the case arguing the law was not violated because its data
collection fell within an exception to the Wiretap Act per 18. U.S.C. §2511(2)(g)(i).79
Under the exception, the interception of “electronic communication” that is “readily
accessible to the general public” is permitted.80 Two legal arguments flowed from the
statutory exception. First, Google proposed the unencrypted Wi-Fi signal collected are a
“radio communication” which by definition is “readily accessible to the general public”.
Second, Google argued that even if it wasn’t a “radio communication” it was an

Hanni Fakhoury, “What the Google Street View Means for Researchers (and Cops)”, Electric Frontier
Foundation, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/what-google-street-view-decision-means-researchersand-cops, September 16th, 2013.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Joffe, 729 F.3d. 1262 at 1263.
79
Id.
80
18. U.S.C. §2511(2)(g)(i)
74
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electronic communication that was “readily accessible to the general public” like a
message posted to a public message board.81
Because the Wiretap Act does not specifically define what a “radio
communication” means, the Court had to first resolve whether Wi-Fi signals are in fact
what Congress intended to include under the exception.82 Ultimately, the Court denied
Google’s motion finding that unencrypted Wi-Fi signals were not "radio
communications," but rather electronic communications.83 The Court concluded that
Congress meant a "radio communication" to mean a "predominantly auditory broadcast"
like an AM/FM radio broadcast. Since the data sent over a Wi-Fi signal is not auditory,
the Court held that it was not a "radio communication" under the Wiretap Act, regardless
of whether a wireless access point used radio frequencies to communicate.84 In
determining that the "radio communication" exception did not apply, the Court also
rejected Google's second argument that unencrypted Wi-Fi signals are "readily accessible
to the general public."85 The Court noted that unlike a radio station which could broadcast
for miles, Wi-Fi signals are "geographically limited and fail to travel far beyond the walls
of the home or office where the access point is located."86 In addition, the Court reasoned
Wi-Fi signals aren't "accessible" because capturing them "requires sophisticated hardware
and software" and "most of the general public lacks the expertise to intercept and decode
payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network."87 With this decision, the lawsuit against
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Google will continue, leaving the understanding and application of the Wiretap Act in a
legal grey area.

V.

WHAT COMPANIES UTILIZING GEOLOCATION
TECHNOLOGIES SHOULD IMPLEMENTS

With the advent of geolocation technologies, the modern wired world has changed the
way we interact considerably as the private sphere has become capable of new, seamless
ways of tracking individuals.88 Private companies can now effortlessly obtain electronic
personal information that was once only preview to the government through an
investigation.89 As explained in Part II, geolocation technologies pose a considerable risk
to individual privacy; and yet, Federal agencies have done little to address that risk.90
With the absence of such laws, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has stepped in to
address internet privacy issues, looking to Section 5 of the FTC Act and other rules
governing online communities for guidance.91 Section 5 empowers the Commission to
restrain “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce”.92 Within those principles, the FTC has
stressed heightened protection for “Personally Identifiable Information” (PPI).93 In
general, the Commission defines PPI as information that can be linked to a specific
individual such as a name, postal address, email address, Social Security number, or
driver license number.94
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As noted previously, server-side geolocation technologies pose little risk to an
invasion of PPI as they rely principally on IP-based and SSID-based identification
techniques.95 Server-side tools are not meant to identify a particular user; rather, these
tools seek users regionally within a twenty-five to fifty-mile radius.96 The same cannot
be said for client-side geolocation tools. Again, the user-centric model allows for clientside technologies to more readily collect and disseminate PPI.97 In recent litigation,
Plaintiffs have claimed that Defendant Companies diminished the value of their mobile
devices when the geolocation features collected plaintiff’s PPI.98 While the Ninth Circuit
has yet to address the issue, District Courts have been reluctant to grant plaintiffs a claim
solely based on the theory that the value of their PPI has been diminished.99 However,
when Plaintiffs bring forth other product harms, such as diminished battery capacity,
overpayment theories, privacy issues and questionable user agreements, the Court has
conducted a more thorough analysis of PPI collection.100 Part V will address where
Corporations have both succeeded and failed with their target marketing platforms
through client-side geolocation and how the FTC has addressed them. Through this
analysis, Part V will address the three critical practices Companies and web-site
providers need to consider when utilizing geolocation platforms: 1) provide full discloser
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in User Agreements, 2) obtain user consent with regard to such practices, and 3) provide
security of consumer information once it’s collected.
A. Notice - Clear and Concise Terms and Conditions
Client-side geolocation technologies, which often pinpoint a person’s location
through a user’s internet-connected device or Smart Phone, involve a thorough collection
of PPI; thus, it is imperative that Companies provide significant notice with clear and
concise terms before collecting such personal information. In the past, Companies have
made the mistake of providing notice of data collection that is unclear, ambiguous, or
buried deeply in excruciatingly wordy Terms and Agreement. The FTC has
recommended that Congress enact legislation specifically to ensure a level of privacy
protection by requiring websites and Internet companies to meet standards involving
notice to consumers, consumer access to information, and security.101 While Congress
has yet to establish clear standards per this recommendation, the FTC has interceded in
many cases where internet providers and website operators failed to follow their own
privacy policies.102 One noteworthy instance occurred when the FTC challenged Sear’s
practice of paying customers ten dollars to download software onto costumers’ computers
aimed to collect “research information” such as online purchases, bank statements, video
rentals as well as the senders, recipients, and subjects of email messages. The issue was
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over Sears’ disclosure agreement, which buried the tracking software’s full capabilities in
a lengthy and unclear document. The outcome ended in a settlement agreement where
Sears’ agreed to terminate collecting personal consumer information and destroy the data
previously gathered.103
Open, honest disclosure of information is a critical solution to geolocation privacy
issues and exactly the resolution the FTC and privacy advocates promote.104 Clear notice
will enable consumers to choose the appropriate level of privacy for them and whether
the benefit of the product or service is worth foregoing their privacy.105 In order for
consumers to make an informed decision, Companies must provide them with clear,
comprehensible information. Ironically, one of the biggest offenders, Google, has
traditionally placed disclosure as a top priority.106 In fact, many in the industry would
attribute Google’s success to two important corporate themes: “Be Honest” and “Be
Open”.107 In fact, Google has often lead the way in undertaking measures and making
concessions that other Companies have been unwilling to make.108 Google’s open model
and willingness to admit to its mistakes has propelled the company to dominate
practically every niche it has chosen to enter. Yet, despite the success the search engine
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King has reaped from its open approach, Google has made small steps toward
implementing broad policies of disclosure in the realm of geolocation. To be fair to
Google’s efforts, it has created the program “Dashboard” which enables a user to manage
the personal data associated with a user’s account.109 However, there is still much
progress to be made by Companies like Google utilizing and it is highly recommended
that these entities recognize that open disclosure is the key to consumer confidence.
B. Opt – In Agreement
Another way for Companies to protect themselves is to gain user consent by
providing an “opt in” function to data collection rather than an “opt-out”. If done
properly, heightened consumer privacy would be ensured by holding Companies
accountable for requesting user permission while ensuring that Companies request
permission for geolocation data collection each time they desired it. While FTC
regulations require that sites obtain user’s consent before collecting personal data and
geographic location110, Companies do not always follow suit.111 For instance, in fall
2012, Nordstroms implemented in-store technology that followed Wi-Fi signals of
customers’ Smart Phones to track the customer’s movements throughout the store. The
Wi-Fi tracking in conjunction with video surveillance enabled the clothing retailer to
learn information about its shoppers such as age, sex, time spent in a particular aisle or
department before purchasing merchandise, how frequently shoppers visited the store,
and other demographic information. 112 Needless to say, once costumers caught wind of
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Nordstroms’ experiment, they were outraged and felt the testing without consent was a
serious invasion of privacy. Subsequently, Nordstroms was forced to end its in-store
research and destroyed the data previously collected.113 Understandably, this type of
personal data enables Retailers to better merchandize product to give the consumer a
more efficient trip; however, it is imperative to give the consumer the choice to opt-in
rather than make the decision for her.
Two recent examples show how the opt-in solution works in practice. In 2009,
Google launched its My Location feature for personal computers which used SSIS-based
and client-side geolocation tools to provide “more accurate local search results on Google
third party sites.114 During the product launch, Google sent an automatic prompt message
explaining the My Location feature to all users equipped with Google’s in-browser tool
bar. The message also asked for the user’s consent to install the application, and only
upon the user choosing to opt-in would the product begin to collect and report
geolocation data through My Location.115 In August 2010, Facebook used a similar optin strategy when launching “Facebook Places”, a feature that allowed users to share their
whereabouts with friends through Facebook directly or through other third party
platforms.116 The notice and consent based model was a result of the Social Media
company’s development effort to put a stronger emphasis on user privacy than it had with
previous Facebook features, which drew heavy criticism from the Electronic Frontier
Foundation and other privacy watchdogs.117
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C. Adequate Security of Consumer information once collected
The third concern of the geolocation technology is ensuring adequate safeguards to
keep the personal data safe once collected. Though corporate giants like Google and
Apple claim they take the greatest precautions in securing data, two recent breaches of
the Sony PlayStation 3 system have unmasked some scary realities.118 In April and
October of 2011, criminal hackers successfully accessed online subscriber information
including the credit card numbers of seventy-seven million costumers.119 The events
proved that despite heightened security measures, even megacorporations like Sony may
be unable to keep personal information secure. Thus, it is imperative that entities housing
this personal data are certain the more secure safeguards are in place.
Foursquare, a location-based social networking App, is another company that has
been under fire for faulty security of consumer information. Foursquare is an application
that allows users to “check in” to venues such as restaurants, shops, and perhaps most
frightening, an individual’s home.120 In February 2010, the site ‘Please Rob Me’ was
launched to raise awareness regarding the thoughtlessness of location sharing. The site
automatically scans data from public Twitter feeds that had been pushed from Foursquare
to compile a list of people who are not home. The premise, while putting a humorous spin
on it, is that since the user is not home, you can go rob them. According to the site’s
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founder, “On one end we're leaving lights on when we're going on a holiday, and on the
other we're telling everybody on the internet we're not home." 121
Later in 2010, white hat hacker Jesper Anderson exposed vulnerabilities on
Foursquare that raised significant privacy concerns.122 Foursquare’s location page
displays a grid of fifty randomly chosen pictures of users who “checked in” to a location,
regardless of the users’ privacy settings. So, whenever users “checks in” to a venue, their
picture is generated on that location’s page, even if they only want their friends to know
the location. Anderson was able to fashion a script that collected check-in information
and successfully collected 875,000 check-ins.123 Anderson then contacted Foursquare
regarding the vulnerability and the social networking site changed its’ privacy settings to
allow users to opt-out of being listed on the location page.124 In 2012, Foursquare
announced a change in its Application Programming Interface (API) for increase privacy.
The modification was in response to a number of so-called “stalker” applications, like
“Girls Around Me” and “Nock Nock” that rely on the user geographic data Foursquare
provides to display a list of people filtered by gender who checked in nearby. 125 Again,
as we become more connected, Companies cannot be ignorant to the security risks that
come with the geolocation territory.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Though geolocation capabilities were unheard of less than a decade ago, the
developing technology offers accurate real-time means for identifying a user’s
geographic location. Companies and consumers are increasingly latching on to these
tools – recognizing the wide range of benefits and efficiencies they can offer through
target marketing and social media platforms. However, while the market has reacted
quickly to the developing technology, the law has failed to keep up, leaving both buyer
and seller in the dark. The ongoing march of technological advances is not only a good
thing, it’s essential to the economic and social revolutions of our time. However, as
companies begin to utilize the technology in new and interesting ways, safeguards must
be in place. The infringement of personal privacy by geolocation technologies is a
serious problem that beckons a solution. More and more companies are utilizing the
technology to target market their services or selling that data to third parties unbeknownst
to the user. With a lack of uniform laws to protect personal information, the consumer is
largely unaware of the transaction occurring, to whom that data may be benefitting, and
who may be able to purchase the information.
At the end of the day, consumer privacy is critical to maintain and the Federal
Government must take action to protect it. However, until that day comes, it will be up
the FTC and States to implement privacy policies and hold Companies accountable for
deceptively tracking personal information. Likewise, for the sake of good social policy,
Companies utilizing geolocation should look to provide users with notice in clear User
and Privacy Agreements, allow for a user to opt-in to the technology, and ensure the most
secure practices to keep personal information safe. Disclosure is key and Companies
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must be honest and open to instill consumer confidence. Geolocation tools will continue
to develop and the “Googles” of the world will always be on the cutting edge of it as they
should. Still, it’s imperative that Corporations act responsibly; consumers continue to ask
the important privacy questions; and for the Court system to keep up with the rapidly
changing technology and establish new precedent to guide our modern world.
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